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In the absence of governmental checks and balances present 
in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint 
upon executive policy and power in the areas of national 
defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened 
citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which 
alone can here protect the values of democratic government.1 
-Justice Potter Stewart 
In October 2008, the author moderated a panel discussion 
addressing the utility of establishing a new national security court system for 
administering the detention and trial of terrorist suspects.  The discussion 
featured comments by five lawyers with significant research and practical 
experience in the field.  Richard Zabel is a partner and co-chair of the 
Litigation Group at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.  Mr. Zabel 
served previously as an Assistant U.S. Attorney and is co-author of In 
Pursuit of Justice:  Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts.2  
Glenn L. Sulmasy is an Associate Professor of Law at the United States 
                                                     
 
∗ © Mark R. Shulman 2009.  Assistant Dean for Graduate Programs/International Affairs, 
Adjunct Professor of Law at Pace Law School and Chair of the Committee on International Human 
Rights, Association of the Bar of the City of New York.  This article is based on comments 
delivered at International Law Weekend, Oct. 18, 2008. 
1. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring).  Accord STEPHEN DYCUS, ARTHUR L. BERNEY, WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 3 (4th ed. 2007) (citing Id. and observing that the “failure of 
courts to give authoritative answers to many questions of national security law suggests to some 
that public opinion is what ultimately counts in this field”). 
2. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT 
OF JUSTICE:  PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). 
2 ILSA Journal of Int’l & Comparative Law [Vol. 15:2 
Coast Guard Academy and author of the forthcoming book, The National 
Security Court System:  A Natural Evolution of Justice in an Age of Terror.3  
Hina Shamsi is a Staff Attorney in the American Civil Liberties Union’s 
National Security Project and author of various works on torture and 
“extraordinary rendition.”  Gabor Rona serves as International Legal 
Director at Human Rights First and has written extensively on the 
application of international human rights and humanitarian law to terrorism.4  
Matthew C. Waxman served as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Detainee Affairs and is now an Associate Professor at Columbia 
Law School and author of Detention As Targeting:  Standards of Certainty 
and Detention of Suspected Terrorists.5  The panel discussion was frank and 
wide-ranging; it contributed to the objective of ensuring an “informed and 
critical public opinion” the likes of which Justice Potter Stewart endorsed in 
his New York Times concurrence quoted above.6  Completed in the closing 
hours of the Bush Administration, the following article presents some of the 
salient points from that discussion.  It reflects the perspectives of its author 
and not necessarily those of the panelists. 
I. A FEARFUL NEW WORLD? 
During the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States has grappled publicly with questions about how to detain, interrogate, 
and try those accused of plotting to harm national security.  More than other 
episodes in recent American history, the rise of a transnational threat from 
violent Islamists has raised a series of interrelated policy issues that define a 
generation’s understanding of the meaning of its republic.  Some of the 
issues resurrect long-standing constitutional debates such as the substance of 
presidential emergency powers, the proper separation of war powers 
between Congress and the Executive, and the appropriate roles of the 
                                                     
 
3. GLENN L. SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL 
EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Sulmasy 2009].  
See also Glenn Sulmasy, This Way to Exit Gitmo, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (NRO), July 6, 2006, 
available at 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YzU5YjZlZWZhOWRhNWE1MzI4ZjQzYTAxOGQ4MzczZ
WY= (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
4. See Gabor Rona, A Bull in the China Shop: The ‘War on Terror’ and International Law 
in the United States, 39 CAL. W. INT. L. J. 101 (2008); Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of U.S. Practice 
Relating to ‘Enemy Combatants’, 10 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L., 232–50 (2008); Gabor Rona, 
Enemy Combatants in the ‘War on Terror’: A Case Study of how Myopic Lawyering Makes Bad 
Law, 30, No. 1, ABA NAT’L SEC. L. REP. (2008). 
5. Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of 
Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008). 
6. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713. 
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judiciary in adjudicating these disputes and in regulating foreign policy.  
These constitutional questions have been subjected to lively debate since the 
beginning of the republic.  Other issues arise mostly due to the 
transformational effects of globalization.  Al Qaeda’s reach is global—as are 
the interests, assets, and vulnerabilities of the United States.  Likewise, 
global supply chains, jet-age travel systems, the World-Wide Web, and 
universal human rights treaties collectively weave a global community in 
which the effects of perturbations are wide-spread and magnified.  Many of 
these issues arise because the United States is confronting a large-scale, non-
state threat that extends to the homeland and does so in an age in which 
individual rights and responsibilities are much more fully articulated than 
they had been in previous generations.  The United States has confronted 
other large, non-state threats to domestic security before, most notably 
during the post-Reconstruction Era when white supremacists sought to undo 
the political outcome of the Civil War.7  But the emergence over the past 
sixty years of relatively robust norms and law protecting civil, political, and 
human rights has reshaped the power of states over individuals.  Now these 
newly articulated rights are constantly being weighed against concerns for 
national security.8  Globalization is rapidly transforming the norms and the 
means of national security and lawyers within the government and without 
have been working hard to ensure that the rule of law continues to play a 
relevant and constructive role as the environment in which it is situated 
undergoes revolutionary changes.  Unsurprisingly, the cutting edge of this 
transformation is at the place where a state’s interest in survival abuts that of 
an individual. 
The putative tension between national security and individual rights 
emerges in several areas but nowhere as dramatically as in the detention and 
trial of accused terrorists.9  Since 2001, the United States has detained 
                                                     
 
7. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877 (Ann Finlayson ed., 1988) (1984); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM 
CROW (2d rev. ed., 1966); STANLEY KANTROWITZ & BEN TILLMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF 
WHITE SUPREMACY (2000). 
8. Another important area where national security confronts individual rights that has not 
received as much attention is in military targeting.  What due process is owed to suspected al 
Qaeda members in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan when U.S. forces target 
and attack them? 
9. See Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security, 85 NEB. L. REV. 454 (2006) (analyzing the 
definitions of security implied by a liberty/security balance to enlighten any discussion of 
tradeoffs); Irwin Cotler, Terrorism, Security and Rights: The Dilemma of Democracies, 14 NAT’L 
J. CONST. L. 13, 13 (2002) (rejecting the zero sum analysis of national security versus civil 
liberties); William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security:  The Strategic 
Correlation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 249, 249 (2004) (arguing that “subordination of human rights 
to national security is both unnecessary and strategically questionable”). 
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individuals in jails,10 prisons,11 and military brigs in the United States,12 in 
secret “black sites” abroad, in various facilities in Iraq13 and Afghanistan,14 
and a special purpose facility at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba.15  The government has also utilized a system of renditions and 
“extraordinary renditions” to detain and interrogate terrorist suspects in 
facilities operated by other states.16  The government has also sponsored 
trials in immigration17 and district courts and an evolving system of military 
tribunals.18  This patchwork of detention and trial has been shaped by many 
factors, some express and others that lay unstated.  Sometimes existing 
facilities, such as immigration courts proved reasonably convenient.  In 
other circumstances, the Bush Administration found reasons to craft new 
institutions, sometimes with the support of Congress.19  Because people’s 
lives and liberty are at stake, these policies and practices have been highly 
contentious. 
                                                     
 
10. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ENDING SECRET DETENTIONS 13 (2004), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/EndingSecretDetentions_web.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 
2009) (documenting the widespread detentions). 
11. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Discusses Creation of 
Military Tribunals to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060906-3.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) 
[hereinafter President Bush Speech]. 
12. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 596 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 
432 (2004). 
13.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Iraq: Beyond Abu Ghraib: Detention and Torture in Iraq, Mar. 
2006, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/001/2006/en/dom-
MDE140012006en.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE NEW IRAQ? 
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN IRAQI CUSTODY 2 (Jan. 2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0105.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
14. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM 3 (Mar. 2004), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0304.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
15. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Status of Detainees at Guantánamo (Feb. 7, 
2002), available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2002/0802fleischerdetainees.htm (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2009). 
16. See Torture By Proxy: International And Domestic Law Applicable To “Extraordinary 
Renditions,” in THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF 9/11 (Silkenat & Shulman 
eds., 2007). 
17. See William Glaberson, A Nation Challenged:  The Law; U.S. Asks to Use Secret 
Evidence In Many Cases Of Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at 1B (noting the use of 
immigration courts). 
18. See President Bush Speech, supra note 11 (describing post-9/11 military tribunals). 
19. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 119 Stat. 2742 
(2005); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
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II. THE CURRENTS RUNNING BELOW GUANTÁNAMO 
For seven years, opinions have varied widely about how to 
characterize the contemporary security environment; this lack of consensus 
has led to bitter disagreements about policy.  In this way, 9/11 differs 
dramatically from the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.  On December 8, 1941, 
every American agreed that the United States was at war with Japan and 
many policy prescriptions flowed axiomatically from that observation.  In 
contrast, the current situation has failed to produce a clear consensus, 
leaving people to hold highly divergent opinions about the policies that 
should be implemented.  These opinions reflect different views of reality, 
not just empirical facts, but also more essential characterizations about the 
dynamics of interactions among humans and among states.  The following 
section identifies seven such disagreements that help explain the legal and 
policy debates surrounding post-9/11 detention, interrogation, and trial 
policies.  Each illustrates the acute juxtaposition a government faces in 
meeting transnational and serious threats in the “Age of Rights.”20  Already 
alluded to, the first goes directly to the overall characterization of the 
situation:  that the United States is and ought rightly to be engaged in a 
“Global War on Terrorism.”  The second reflects long-standing national 
security concerns:  that intelligence sources and methods must by all means 
be protected in order to ensure their continued utility for promoting security.  
The third is relatively new and hotly contested:  some people must be 
tortured or otherwise subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques” and 
then tried.  The fourth is less often discussed but of growing legal 
significance:  some detainees are actually dangerous, but not to the United 
States or its allies.  Fifth, there might be certain people in captivity who 
intend to harm U.S. interests but have not entered into a criminal conspiracy 
or committed an act for which a criminal court could convict them.  Sixth, 
distrust of the Executive or the Bush Administration itself became 
increasingly evident and material in shaping policy.  The seventh, and final, 
cluster of issues is the nature of the relationship between the detention 
policies and national security.  Each of these seven assumptions has 
complicated U.S. policies and practices of detaining, interrogating, and 
trying people thought to be part of a terrorist enterprise.  Each of these issues 
merits some further discussion, offered below. 
First, is the United States in a “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) and 
ought it to be?  As I have argued more extensively elsewhere, the 
problematic concept of a “Global War on Terror” has distorted detention and 
                                                     
 
20. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1989) (arguing that in an era characterized by 
formal consensus recognizing universal claims to human dignity, state practices vary too widely). 
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trial policies by biasing decision-making toward military solutions.21  The 
traditional concept of war has been state-centered.  Two or more states put 
men in uniform, arm and train them, and then deploy them on a battlefield 
with orders to fight to achieve legitimate objectives.  Over the centuries, two 
bodies of law have developed to regulate warfare.  Jus ad bellum sets the 
chronological and geographic boundaries of war.  It requires that wars begin 
and end, and it protects the rights of neutrals.  Jus in bello embodies the 
constraints on the conduct of war.  It limits war with a calculus that military 
objectives may be achieved only by means that are necessary, proportional, 
and discriminate.  It protects non-combatants.22  By labeling the current 
situation vis-à-vis al Qaeda and its affiliates as a “war,” the Bush 
Administration appears inadvertently to have invoked a law of war paradigm 
that has frequently proven itself inapt and unhelpful.  For these reasons, 
many people have been seeking to move away from the term “Global War 
on Terror.”  In fact, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has forsaken the 
phrase in a post-election essay on U.S. strategy in Foreign Affairs.23  
However, because it is hard to replace something with nothing, President 
Bush, among others, has argued that abandoning the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) would leave the United States and its allies with criminal law 
enforcement mechanisms as the only meaningful tool for addressing the 
terrorist threat.24  In place of the GWOT, I would restore Franklin 
Roosevelt’s articulation of the Four Freedoms to the centerpiece of U.S. 
                                                     
 
21. Mark R. Shulman, The Four Freedoms as Good Law and Grand Strategy in an Age of 
Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 555 (2008) (arguing that the so-called “Global War on Terror” 
skews national decision—and policy-making toward military solutions when a more balanced 
strategy would reflect human rights and development policies as well). 
22. Traditionally jus in bello has been called the “Law of War.”  Since the U.N. Charter 
outlawed war, this body of law has been renamed the “Law of Armed Conflict” by war-fighters 
and “International Humanitarian Law” by civilian jurists.  For historical background, see MICHAEL 
HOWARD, GEORGE J. ANDREOPOULOS & MARK R. SHULMAN, THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS 
ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1994). 
23. Robert M. Gates, A Balanced Strategy:  Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, 
88 FOREIGN AFF. 28–29 (2009) (“What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, 
worldwide irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of 
moderation.”).  Id. 
24. See VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE U.S., VFW NATIONAL CONVENTION: BUSH 
SUMS UP VET, WAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS (Aug. 20, 2008), 
http://www.vfw.org/index.cfm?fa=news.newsDtl&did=4681 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (quoting 
President George W. Bush “We’re at war against determined enemies, and we must not rest until 
that war is won.  This war cannot be won, however, if we treat terrorism primarily as a matter of 
law enforcement.”).  Id. See also IAN SHAPIRO, CONTAINMENT: REBUILDING A STRATEGY 
AGAINST GLOBAL TERROR 4 (2007) (arguing for a strategy of containment because the U.S. faces 
real threats that are not subsumable into a war and that “you can’t beat something with nothing.”). 
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grand strategy.  They offer a short-hand for an appealing, balanced, and 
principled decision-making. 
Second, the real need to protect intelligence sources and methods 
has also complicated detention and trial policy.  Traditional distinctions 
between  
1)  war and peace;  
2)  foreign and U.S. persons; and  
3)  national intelligence and domestic criminal 
investigations  
have led to different legal regimes protecting individuals from surveillance 
and investigation.  These distinctions emerged in eras characterized by 
strong notions of state sovereignty.  Typically, only states possessed the 
assets to wage war.  People were citizens or subjects to only one sovereign 
and the constitutional rights of U.S. persons generally sufficed to insulate 
them from invasive surveillance or investigation by banning intelligence 
surveillance of them25 or by requiring police to obtain a warrant from an 
independent court before proceeding.26  These protections guarded not only 
U.S. persons but also the intelligence agencies in that they are not required 
to go to trial and disclose their sources or methods in order to ensure a 
criminal defendant’s right to confront the evidence used against him.27  In 
the GWOT, however, these three traditional distinctions have blurred, 
putting strain on detention and trial practices.  Non-state actors can access 
weapons of mass destruction.  They can cross borders quickly and without 
detection, and they can abuse constitutional protections to cause catastrophic 
harm.  At the same time, government claims about the need to protect 
sources and methods are inevitably opaque and may potentially be offered in 
bad faith (for instance to protect officials from embarrassment).28 
                                                     
 
25. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 2.3(b) (1981) (Agencies within the 
Intelligence Community may not undertake surveillance activities “for the purpose of acquiring 
information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons.”). 
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1801–1811 (1978) (statute establishing FISA court). 
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding 
that, under the Confrontation Clause, out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial are 
barred, unless witnesses are unavailable and defendants had prior opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by a court); see also Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (concluding that a defendant has the right to be informed 
of the charges against him). 
28. Br. for American Civil Liberties Union as amici curiae supporting appellees, ACLU v. 
Dep’t of Def., No. 06-3140-cv, 543 F.3d 59, 64 (2008) (in which plaintiffs alleged the Freedom of 
Information Act requests for release of photographs of Abu Ghraib were denied not to protect 
national security but to protect government officials from political or personal embarrassment).  
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The third major assumption remains highly contentious:  the extent 
to which various Bush Administration initiatives were shaped to facilitate 
torture or other “enhanced interrogation techniques.”  Torture violates U.S.29 
and international law.30  Senior Bush Administration officials claimed “the 
United States does not torture” because its interrogation practices do not 
constitute torture.31  However, the Bush Administration has also 
acknowledged use of water-boarding and other so-called “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” which others conclude does indeed constitute 
torture.32  Presumably, the U.S. government would be embarrassed and any 
criminal prosecutions would be jeopardized if it were shown to have tortured 
prisoners and attempted to introduce into open court information obtained 
during the course of that torture.  Moreover, those responsible for torture 
might be subject to criminal prosecution themselves.  Finally, the United 
States would lose even more credibility and support from abroad if policies 
of torture were acknowledged.  Therefore, the government may have 
numerous motivations to avoid releasing information that would expose 
evidence of torture.  These incentives conflict with the government’s interest 
in using all available tools to obtain conviction of individuals suspected of 
plotting or committing terrorist acts. 
The fourth assumption shaping the climate for interrogating and 
trying accused terrorists is the fact that the U.S. Government has detained 
                                                                                                                            
 
For a wise discussion of the basic problem, see DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998). 
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(c), 2340(1). 
30. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (the United States signed the 
Convention on Apr. 18, 1988 and ratified it on Oct. 21, 1994). 
31. See President Bush Speech, supra note 11.  During this speech President Bush stated, “I 
want to be absolutely clear with our people, and the world:  The United States does not torture.  It’s 
against our laws, and it’s against our values.”  Id. 
32. See Interview with Vice President Richard B. Cheney, former Vice-President of the 
United States, by Jonathan Karl, ABC News, available at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6464697 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (Vice President Cheney admitting that he believes water-boarding to be 
an “appropriate” method of interrogation) and Susan Crawford’s remarkable admission that the 
United States did torture Mohammed al-Qahtani.  Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. 
Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html?hpid=topnews (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) 
(convening authority of the military commissions stating “‘His treatment met the legal definition of 
torture. And that’s why I did not refer the case’ for prosecution.”); see also David Stout, Holder 
Tells Senator Waterboarding is Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16holdercnd.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009), for 
the testimony of Eric Holder before Senate Judiciary Committee on January 14, 2009 and for a 
scholarly evaluation of water-boarding.  See Evan Wallach, Drop By Drop: Forgetting The History 
Of Water Torture In U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468 (2007) (arguing that water-
boarding is torture as defined by U.S. courts). 
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some people who do not pose and have not posed a threat to American 
interests.33  Some are innocent of crimes or criminal intentions but were 
detained because of an honest mistake, because of sloppy procedures, or 
because a third-party intentionally misled U.S. forces into accepting custody 
of them.  Without being able to determine who among them is innocent, the 
government jeopardizes national security by releasing them.  Others intend 
no harm to the United States but do plausibly pose a danger to other 
countries if released.  This complex situation—along with the arduous and 
perhaps impossible task of sorting them out accurately—has further 
complicated the United States’ position.  On the other hand, and to 
paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, hard cases should not be permitted to 
make bad law.  The new Obama Administration has the opportunity to 
develop policies that will produce individualized determinations of 
innocence and guilt without being bound by imprudent Bush precedent. 
The fifth assumption is that there are some people who intend to 
harm U.S. national security but who have not committed any acts that would 
result in a criminal conviction.  The government has alleged that certain 
people have expressed dangerous intentions but cannot be charged with 
crimes, either because doing so would compromise sources and methods or 
because they have not had the opportunity yet to attack American interests.  
Once again, developing a factual account of these individuals and their 
intentions is complicated both by the need to protect intelligence resources 
and by the fact that the crimes are at most inchoate.  The assumption that 
some people would harm the United States if set free, gave rise to proposals 
for the establishment of civil or “administrative” detention schemes such as 
that proposed by panelist Matthew Waxman.34  On the other hand, 
                                                     
 
33. For a useful survey, see MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., PROFILE OF RELEASE GUANTÁNAMO 
PRISONERS: THE GOVERNMENT’S STORY THEN AND NOW (2008), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/center_policyresearch/reports/detainees_then_and_now_final.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2009).  The New York Times has compiled another useful index of prisoners in The 
Guantánamo Docket, The Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, available at 
http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).  For one of the most 
controversial examples, see In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 2008 WL 4725712 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 24, 2008) (17 Chinese national Uighurs were ordered to be released by Judge Richard Urbina). 
34. See Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention:  The Integration of Strategy and 
Legal Process, (The Brookings Institute, Working Paper, July 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/0724_detention_waxman/0724_detention_
waxman.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (addressing the question “in combating terrorism, why 
administratively detain, and detain whom?”); John Farmer, A Terror Threat in the Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008 (former U.S. Attorney favoring a preventive detention scheme to clarify rules 
and prevent attacks); Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 2007 (one conservative and one liberal law professor jointly proposing that specialized Article 
III judges administer a preventive detention system that Congress would define); BENJAMIN 
WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008) 151.  
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prosecutions for inchoate crimes or even use of the material witness statute 
may obviate the need for such a radical new system.  After all, federal 
prosecutors have had notable success over the years prosecuting individuals 
for other crimes (such as money laundering or fraud) or criminal conspiracy.  
It may well be that zealous U.S. attorneys could obtain convictions of the 
guilty.  Because the Bush Administration so often avoided presenting their 
arguments and evidence before the Article III courts, we do not know how 
professional prosecutors would fare.  Once again, this factual indeterminacy 
leaves open a variety of policy choices.  At this point the decision to 
prosecute should remain within the discretion of the prosecutor (working as 
appropriate with the law enforcement and intelligence communities) while 
the need for a new preventive detention scheme remains unproven and 
would overturn the fundamental constitutional principle that an individual is 
innocent before the law until proven guilty. 
The sixth element running throughout the discourse is a palpable 
distrust of the Executive and particularly of the Bush Administration.  The 
distrust falls into several categories.  There is a long-standing general 
distrust of the Executive held by some human rights and libertarian groups 
(and a small number of partisans of the Legislative branch).  Their 
suspicions have inevitably been amplified by the muscular interpretation of 
executive authority exercised by the Bush Administration since the autumn 
of 2001, as well as by its particular brand of secretiveness.  They were 
further amplified for some who had concluded that some of the secretiveness 
was intended to obscure laziness, incompetence, or venality rather than such 
legitimate governmental interests as intelligence sources and methods, or the 
need to act quickly or without attribution.  By late 2008, the distrust had 
expanded even further, perhaps because of the perceived lack of democratic 
legitimacy of an administration that appears to have been rebuked in the 
national election.  Presumably, much of this distrust will be allayed by the 
Obama Administration, giving the government some new space in which to 
devise solutions. 
The seventh and most complicated set of issues arises out of the 
complex relationship between the Bush Administration’s detention policies 
and actual national security.  The Bush Administration consistently claimed 
that its policies were correctly designed and properly implemented in order 
to ensure security.  Those detained were the worst of the worst, and their 
detention was both essential and effective.  Conditions were appropriate.  
Methods of interrogation were both lawful and necessary.  Any exceptions 
were aberrations attributable to a few bad apples.  On the other hand, critics 
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argued that the detentions and interrogations were in great part unlawful and 
that they undermined national security by inflaming tensions and alienating 
the United States in the world court of public opinion.  Most experts who are 
not currently serving in the Bush Administration conclude that torture does 
not produce useful information.  And while the federal courts have resolved 
many of the legal questions35 (at least for now), the security question may 
ultimately prove impossible to resolve.  Justice Stewart’s view that public 
opinion plays a critical role in assessing the legality of national security 
measures36 can be extended to drawing conclusions about their effectiveness.  
Indeed, their effectiveness reinforces assessments of their legitimacy.  
However, Justice Stewart’s concurrence addressed the relatively specific 
question of prior censorship and writing in 1971; he could not reasonably 
take into account only the opinion of the American public.37  Today, the 
United States depends on global good will that in turn rests on its reputation 
for fairness.  To the extent the United States is viewed as responsible for 
torture and other serious insults inflicted at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, it 
is alienating people and possibly fostering terrorism.38  If this 
political/strategic conclusion is correct, then the question of whether to 
create national security courts should be approached with great caution.  If 
they appear unfair—ad hoc, less lawful, discriminatory, or hypocritical—
they may diminish America’s soft power. 
III. DO WE NEED NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS? 
Buffeted by the powerful forces described above and frustrated by 
the nation’s inability to find a one-stop shop for administering detentions 
and trials, some learned commentators have proposed the establishment of 
special purpose national security courts.  These proposals suggest that such a 
system offers benefits in expediency and efficiency and enhanced security 
for the trial and for its participants and the community in which it is held.  
They also say that national security courts offer a sensible way of managing 
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the high stakes of releasing someone who should not have been.  This might 
be a person who turns out to be dangerous or someone who would not have 
been dangerous if left alone but who has become radicalized as a byproduct 
of U.S. detention or treatment.  Such a system also answers an unstated (but 
misguided) implication that a regularly established judicial system would 
not be harsh enough, i.e., the interrogation and trial ought themselves to be 
punishing.  Finally, they propose that a national security court system could 
administer a system that would address the possibility that some of the 
detainees are only guilty of holding a status or aspiration not of any act for 
which one could be convicted within the existing legal system. 
The most notable proposal came in the summer of 2007 shortly 
before its author was nominated to serve as Attorney General of the United 
States.  In a widely cited op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, Michael 
Mukasey called on Congress to consider establishing special terror courts.39  
Mukasey did not propose anything that had not been suggested by others 
previously, but several factors made his proposal particularly notable.  First, 
he was among the few people with directly relevant personal experience; as 
a one-time federal district court judge, Mukasey had presided over the trials 
and conviction of Omar Abdel Rahman and the first trial José Padilla.40  
Mukasey had first-hand experience with terrorist trials and could attest to 
their challenges.  Second, he received his nomination shortly after 
publishing the high-profile op-ed piece, giving rise to speculation that the 
Bush Administration was endorsing the model of terror courts.  Third, as 
Attorney General, Mukasey would have the capacity (perhaps even the 
obligation) to pursue this concept.  And finally, as a smart and experienced 
lawyer, Mukasey makes a facially appealing argument.  He argued that the 
U.S. record for trying accused terrorists is poor; too few trials were 
undertaken at too great a cost.  They strained financial and security 
resources, jeopardized intelligence sources and methods, and may have 
forced unintended consequences such as relaxing procedural due process 
standards in ordinary criminal trials or pushing interrogation overseas to less 
“squeamish” jurisdictions.41  While the Mukasey op-ed piece contained few 
details, it did cite favorably to more extended treatments produced by 
Andrew C. McCarthy and Alykhan Velshi of the Center for Law & 
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Counterterrorism42 and by former Deputy Attorney General George J. 
Terwilliger.43 
The concept of a national security court has received support from a 
number of commentators, most, but not all of them, political conservatives.  
In addition to those produced by Terwilliger, McCarthy, and Velshi, the 
National Review’s Stuart Taylor published the “Case for a National Security 
Court” in The Atlantic.44  Amos Guiora and John Parry published “Light at 
the End of the Pipeline?:  Choosing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists” in the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review.45  Also of note, former head of 
President George W. Bush’s Office of Legal Counsel Jack Goldsmith 
teamed up with Salim Hamdan’s Supreme Court lawyer Neil Katyal to write 
a New York Times op-ed, “The Terrorists’ Court.”46  More recently, panelist 
Glenn Sulmasy completed the first major book-length treatment of this topic 
in his forthcoming The National Security Court System:  a Natural 
Evolution of Justice in an Age of Terror.47  All these proposals would 
establish a court to administer the trial of terrorist subjects.  Some also 
recommend that such a court administer a preventive detention scheme.48 
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Opposition to the creation of national security courts has in many 
ways mirrored the movement in favor of establishing them.  Many of the 
arguments have appeared in human rights organization-sponsored reports49 
and newspaper op-ed pieces,50 and the voices are mostly liberal.  However, 
that last fact did not stop John C. Coughenour, a Reagan appointee on the 
federal bench in Seattle, from opining that “American courts, guided by the 
principles of our Constitution, are fully capable of trying suspected 
terrorists.”51  Much like Mukasey, Judge Coughenour based his conclusions 
in great part on his personal experience; he had overseen the trial and 
conviction of an Algerian national, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called 
“millennium bomber.”52  Coughenour also observed that the perceived 
fairness of regular district courts offers a strategic benefit as well.  “For two 
years after his conviction [and sentencing to twenty-two years], thanks in 
part to the fairness he was shown by the court, Mr. Ressam provided useful 
intelligence to terrorism investigations around the world as German, Italian, 
French, and British authorities were willing to attest.”53  For purposes of 
evaluating arguments based mostly on one judge’s first-hand observations, 
Coughenour’s op-ed appears to meet and cancel out that of Mukasey. 
One major report collected the informed perspectives of a far larger 
sample set than the one or two experienced by Judges Mukasey and 
Coughenour.  Former Assistant U.S. Attorneys James Benjamin and panelist 
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Richard Zabel headed up a team of investigators at their law firm (Akin 
Gump) to research the experience of ordinary terrorist trials.  The Akin 
Gump team worked closely with the professional staff at Human Rights First 
(led by panelist Gabor Rona) to develop the thoroughly researched In 
Pursuit of Justice:  Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts.54  
The premise of this White Paper is that special purpose national security 
courts should be established only if the extant and time-tested system of 
Article III courts is shown to be inadequate to the task.  In this effort, the 
Akin Gump team pored over the “docket sheets, motion papers . . . judicial 
opinions [and] . . . press accounts” and interviewed prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and judges with “firsthand [terrorism litigation] experience” in the 
123 federal criminal cases involving Islamist terrorism.55  Zabel and 
Benjamin concluded that: 
The criminal justice system is reasonably well equipped to 
handle most international terrorism cases. Specifically, 
prosecuting terrorism defendants in the court system 
appears as a general matter to lead to just, reliable results 
and not to cause serious security breaches or other problems 
that threaten the nation’s security.  Of course, challenges 
arise from time to time—sometimes serious ones—but most 
of these challenges are not unique to international terrorism 
cases.56 
They go on to note frankly what they could not discern, in particular, 
information about cases that were not brought for one reason or another.57  
Indeed, such instances have been darkly alluded to by other experienced 
prosecutors and government officials although never in sufficient detail for a 
non-participant to evaluate the claims.58 
Another important set of perspectives about special-purpose terror 
courts can be gained by reviewing the experience of other countries.  The 
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foreign experiences with such courts offer considerable insights into their 
strengths and weaknesses.  Based on my understanding of these histories, I 
would tentatively conclude that these institutions have neither enhanced 
national security nor insulated ordinary domestic legal systems against the 
lowering of judicial standards for transparency, impartiality, and 
fundamental fairness to the accused. 
National security or terrorist courts in other countries offer troubling 
lessons, mostly because of their implications for the respect for civil liberties 
generally—not only of the accused, but of the wider population.  Existing 
proposals to create such a court in the United States inadequately account for 
this risk, or explain how it would be minimized or mitigated.  Emergency 
systems in other countries have invariably reduced civil liberties for the 
general population.  It is understandable that governments wish to be seen to 
be responding to the urgent threats posed by those who use violence to affect 
policy.  However, it is important to recognize that these emergency systems 
in such diverse jurisdictions as Great Britain, Malaysia, and South Africa 
have diminished freedoms for society as a whole. 
This principle lesson derived of foreign experiences is not 
particularly surprising.  Examples abound of domestic emergency measures 
taken to promote national security that have undermined the base norm 
presumption of innocence that lies at the center of America’s constitutional 
order.  The large-scale internment of Japanese-Americans during the Second 
World War provides a notorious example.59  In that case, the federal courts 
deferred to the Executive’s misguided policy and thereby created a new and 
heinous rule allowing for internment, displacement, and forced sales of 
property based on no more than the notion that citizens of a given race might 
seek to harm the United States.60  Although the United States has officially 
apologized for this shameful episode, Korematsu has not been overruled in 
the two generations since the Supreme Court handed down its 6-3 decision.61  
The Korematsu precedent may have given some legal cover for the large 
scale detention of Americans of Moslem, Arab, or Middle-Eastern 
background in the months following September 11.62  These discriminatory 
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policies undermine the soft power America otherwise derives from its role 
as a leader in promoting respect for human rights. 
In other countries, emergency powers have had a similarly 
deleterious effect on civil liberties.  In the United Kingdom, in order to 
address violence originating in troubled Northern Ireland, the government 
revoked the right to trial by jury for criminal offenses; denied access to legal 
counsel; held prisoners without charge; and allowed coercive interrogation 
techniques and admitted confessions elicited because of them, among other 
measures.63  In Malaysia, the government transferred judges from their 
positions to avoid judicial review of its decisions or release of suspects 
arrested without even probable cause—in violation of well-established 
constitutional law.64  In apartheid South Africa, judicial review was revoked 
for interrogation purposes.  These extra-judicial detentions lasted weeks.  In 
addition to radical nationalists, they swept up completely harmless nuns and 
pastors urging more widespread equality and access to education.65  Three 
cases, of course, do not constitute a comprehensive survey or prove the 
point.  Even the Akin Gump survey of 123 domestic cases can lead only to 
limited conclusions.  However, these three examples do offer insights into 
the threats to liberty posed by special purpose terrorism courts. 
IV. QUO VADIS? 
Would a system of national security courts offer the kind of 
specialized justice necessary for addressing the threat posed by radical 
Islamists or others who seek to use terrorist means?  Or, in a tragic parallel 
to the Stuart kings’ infamous Star Chamber, would these courts ultimately 
undermine the nation’s security by degrading both its legal system and the 
soft power derived from its cherished reputation as a model for justice?  On 
the eve of the inauguration of Barack Obama, these critical questions remain 
unresolved in the court of “public opinion which alone can here protect the 
values of democratic government.”66 
Over the seven years of trial and error, the Supreme Court and 
Congress have tackled many of the issues raised by the Bush 
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Administration’s programs for detaining, interrogating, and trying those 
alleged to be guilty of terrorism.  But the willingness of Congress to take the 
back seat and the Court’s parsimonious approach to interpreting rights in the 
context of national security has left unresolved many critical issues.67  As a 
result, Barack Obama inherits approximately 240 detainees at Guantánamo 
along with the constraints that have developed—or been reconstituted—over 
the past several years.68  Many of these people have been severely 
mistreated, leaving them injured, broken, embittered, and possibly incapable 
of being tried in a properly constituted court of law.  Their mistreatment has 
alienated American allies and untold individuals on whose sympathies the 
nation might otherwise have relied.  At the same time, no one has provided 
conclusive evidence that the existing legal systems are inadequate for trying 
those accused of terrorism.  And while Congress, the courts, and the court of 
public opinion have not yet seriously begun to deal with the questions 
surrounding preventive detention of people not yet captured, little evidence 
has been produced to show that existing systems do not or cannot suffice.  
Despite the clear mandate for “change,” change in this instance may lie at 
the root of these problems.  Based on the experience discussed above, I 
conclude that the United States would be better served by a return to 
normalcy:  restoring time-tested assumptions of innocence until proven 
guilty, of freedom over detention, and the resort to war only as a last resort 
and constrained as to time, place, and means.69 
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